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 Abstract 
It is generally assumed that relational knowledge is the foundation of higher cognition such 
as (analogical and conditional) reasoning, language, the use of relational categories, and 
planning. Dual-system models (e.g., Kahneman, 2011) that divide the realm of cognition into 
two systems with opposing properties (e.g., fast vs. slow, intentional vs. unintentional, 
conscious vs. unconscious, associative vs. propositional) foster the view that other 
psychological phenomena are not relational in nature. In this paper, I argue that the impact of 
relational knowledge is more widespread than dual-system models imply. More specifically, I 
review evidence suggesting that also Pavlovian conditioning, implicit evaluation, and 
habitual responding are mediated by relational knowledge. Considering the idea that 
relational knowledge underlies also fast, unintentional, unconscious, and seemingly 
associative psychological phenomena is not only theoretically important but also reveals new 
opportunities for influencing thinking and behavior.  
 
Keywords: cognition, relational knowledge, Pavlovian conditioning, implicit evaluation, 















                                          Relational Cognition 3 
  As a science of information processing, cognitive psychology aims to uncover the 
knowledge that underlies thinking and behavior. In this context, much attention has been 
directed at relational knowledge, which can be defined as information about the way in which 
elements are related. Consider the statement that John loves Mary. The knowledge implied by 
this statement is relational in that it specifies (a) the relation between John and Mary (i.e., 
loves) and (b) the role that each element plays within that relation (i.e., John is the lover and 
Mary is the beloved; Halford, Wilson, & Phillips, 2010). Mental representations can be 
described as relational if they capture relational knowledge. Simple associative links between 
representations in memory (e.g., John --- Mary) are not relational in this sense because they 
do not specify the nature of the relation between the elements or the role that elements have 
within a relation. More complex associative structures could represent relational knowledge. 
When they do so, these structures qualify as relational representations. However, it is still not 
entirely clear how relational knowledge can be adequately represented in complex associative 
structures such as connectionist networks (Hummel, 2010).  
 At present, it is generally accepted that relational knowledge underlies a range of 
phenomena that are often referred to as instances of higher cognition, such as (analogical and 
conditional) reasoning, the use of language and relational categories, and planning (e.g., 
Halford et al., 2010). It indeed seems a logical necessity that these phenomena require 
relational knowledge. For instance, relational knowledge allows one to appreciate the 
structural consistency between dots on a map and buildings in a city (Halford et al., 2010). 
Such structure consistent mappings lie at the core of analogies (e.g., dot A is to dot B as 
building A is to building B). Likewise, many aspects of language are inherently relational, 
most prominently the human ability to refer to complex relational categories (e.g., brother-in-
law). 
 In this paper, I consider the possibility that also phenomena that are not typically 
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considered to be instances of higher cognition are mediated by relational knowledge. If one 
defines higher cognition as any psychological phenomenon that is mediated by relational 
knowledge, one could thus say that the aim of this paper to reexamine the scope of higher 
cognition. If one by definition limits higher cognition to phenomena such as reasoning, 
language, and planning, then the aim of this paper is to examine which psychological 
phenomena other than instances of higher cognition rely on relational knowledge. Regardless 
of how higher cognition is conceptualized, this paper aims to reassess the role of relational 
knowledge in human thinking and behavior. 
 A reassessment of the role of relational knowledge is important in light of the 
pervasiveness of the alignment assumption in psychological science. This assumption, which 
is most clearly manifested in dual-system models of cognition (e.g., Evans, 2003; Kahneman, 
2011; Sloman, 1996; Strack & Deutsch, 2004), implies that different ways of dividing the 
realm of cognition produce the same parts (Melnikoff & Bargh, 2018; Moors & De Houwer, 
2006a). For instance, Kahneman (2011) distinguishes between System 1 and System 2 
thinking not only on the basis of speed (fast vs. slow) but also in terms of intentionality 
(unintentional vs. intentional), consciousness (unconscious vs. conscious), and the nature of 
processing (associative vs. propositional). This implies that all fast thinking is also 
unintentional, unconscious, and associative whereas all slow thinking is also intentional, 
conscious, and propositional.  
 Although some have recently argued that even proponents of dual-system models never 
took serious the idea that these distinctions are perfectly aligned (Pennycook, De Neys, 
Evans, Stanovich, & Thompson, 2018), dual-system models at the very least draw attention 
away from the complexity of the relations between the various properties of psychological 
phenomena (see Moors, 2016, for an excellent exploration of this complexity). Most relevant 
for the present paper, dual-system models foster the idea that relational knowledge is 
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important only for System 2-type thinking (i.e., thinking that is slow, intentional, conscious, 
and propositional). Indeed, the conclusion that relational knowledge is relevant for System 2 
but not System 1 follows naturally from the assumptions that (1) there are two cognitive 
systems with multiple opposing properties (i.e., the dual-system alignment assumption), (2) 
higher-order cognition such as reasoning, language, and planning are instances of System 2 
thinking (e.g., Kahneman, 2011), and (3) higher-order cognition relies on relational 
knowledge. 
 When, however, the alignment assumption is rejected (as is now done even by 
proponents of dual-system models), one should allow for the possibility that also fast, 
unintentional, unconscious, or seemingly associative ways of thinking and behaving rely on 
relational knowledge. It is precisely this possibility that I examine in this paper. More 
specifically, the focus will be on Pavlovian conditioning, implicit evaluation, and habitual 
responding. These three phenomena are particularly interesting in that they are often seen as 
prototypical examples of psychological phenomena that are fast, unintentional, unconscious, 
or associative. Hence, in line with a dual-systems perspective, it is often assumed that these 
phenomena are mediated by simple associative representations rather than relational 
knowledge. Recent evidence, however, suggests that relational knowledge might be crucial 
for each of these phenomena. If this is the case, then relational knowledge would be much 
more important than previously considered. After reviewing the relevant evidence, I point out 
that exploring the role of relational knowledge in automatic and seemingly irrational ways of 
thinking and behaving can result in new ways of tackling psychological problems. 
Evidence for a Widespread Impact of Relational Knowledge 
Pavlovian Conditioning 
 As an effect, Pavlovian conditioning refers to changes in behavior that are due to the 
spatio-temporal pairing of events (Bouton, 2016; De Houwer, Barnes-Holmes, & Moors, 
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2013). For instance, in fear conditioning, pairing an originally neutral light with an aversive 
electric shock results in the light evoking fear (Craske, Hermans, & Vansteenwegen, 2006). 
Likewise, evaluative conditioning is a change in liking of an originally neutral stimulus that 
occurs as the result of pairing this stimulus with a valenced (i.e., positive or negative) 
stimulus (De Houwer, 2007). Within cognitive psychology, it is most often assumed that 
Pavlovian conditioning effects are mediated by the formation of simple associations between 
representations in memory (Bouton, 2016; see De Houwer, 2018a, for a historical analysis). 
Although different association formation models have been put forward that differ with 
regard to their assumptions about the conditions under which associations are formed and 
influence behavior (see Bouton, 2016, for a review), they all share the assumption that 
conditioning occurs only if pairings result in the formation of associations. Those 
associations are hypothetical structures in memory via which activation can spread from one 
representation to another, thereby allowing stimuli to evoke responses they did not evoke 
before the stimulus pairings. 
 During the past decade, however, my colleagues and I have argued that Pavlovian 
conditioning (in humans) is mediated by the formation of propositional representations (De 
Houwer, 2009, 2018b; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009). In essence, propositions are 
informational units that can specify how things are related. For instance, the propositions 
“light predicts shock” and “light sometimes co-occurs with shock” both involve the concepts 
“light” and “shock” but differ in how those concepts are related. Propositions can be vague 
about the way in which events are related (e.g., “light is somehow related to the shock”) and 
can be irrational (e.g., “light produces the shock”) but all propositions are inherently 
relational in nature. Propositional models postulate that the formation of propositions in 
Pavlovian conditioning is akin to higher-order reasoning: it involves problem solving that is 
directed at discovering the way in which events in the world are related. Hence, these models 
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predict that Pavlovian conditioning and reasoning are moderated by the same variables, 
including verbal instructions, awareness, and mental load. In the following paragraphs, we 
highlight some of the evidence supporting this prediction. 
 First, just like higher-order cognitive phenomena, conditioning in humans is highly 
sensitive to verbal information. Already since the 1930s, we know that a simple instruction 
stating that a light will be followed by a shock, results in fear of the light even if the light and 
shock are never paired (Cook & Harris, 1937). Subsequent research revealed striking 
parallels between the moderators of fear conditioning via instructions and the moderators of 
fear conditioning via the actual pairing of stimuli (see Mertens, Boddez, Sevenster, 
Engelhard, & De Houwer, 2018, for a review, and De Houwer, 2018b, for related evidence 
on evaluative conditioning via instructions). Moreover, instructions and actual pairings can 
jointly influence behavior. For instance, during a first phase, Lovibond (2003, Experiment 3) 
delivered a shock to participants whenever a compound of two colored squares appeared on a 
computer screen. As a result, each color separately evoked fear. Afterwards, he informed 
participants that one of the colors is safe (i.e., never followed by the shock), thus implying 
that the shock on the preceding compound trials was related to the other color. Importantly, 
such a simple instruction (“this color is safe”) increased fear for the other color, 
demonstrating that actual pairings (i.e., on compound trials) and instructions can jointly 
determine behavior. Finally, also instructions about the nature of the relation between stimuli 
(e.g., whether one stimulus is a predictor vs. a cause of the other) have a profound impact on 
Pavlovian conditioning (e.g., Hughes, Ye, Van Dessel, & De Houwer, 2019; Waldmann & 
Holyoak, 1992). The fact that Pavlovian conditioning is highly sensitive to verbal instructions 
fits well with the idea that both pairings and instructions result in propositional (and thus 
relational) knowledge that provides the basis for changes in behavior. 
 Second, Pavlovian conditioning depends heavily on awareness of the relations between 
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stimuli, as well as the availability of working memory resources (see Lovibond & Shanks, 
2002, and Mitchell et al., 2009, for a reviews). Since the 1970s, numerous studies have been 
published in which fear conditioning was observed only in participants who were aware of 
the stimulus contingencies (e.g., Dawson, & Biferno, 1973). On top of this correlational 
evidence, experimental studies showed that variables that influence contingency awareness 
(e.g., the presence of an attention demanding secondary task) also influence fear 
conditioning. For some time, researchers considered the possibility that some types of 
Pavlovian conditioning such as evaluative conditioning might not depend on contingency 
awareness and working memory resources, but recent evidence strongly argues against this 
possibility (see Corneille & Stahl, in press, for a review). For instance, a meta-analysis 
showed that contingency awareness is by far the most important moderator of evaluative 
conditioning, accounting for no less than 36% of the variance (Hofmann, De Houwer, 
Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010). This heavy reliance of various Pavlovian conditioning 
effects on contingency awareness and working memory resources parallels findings in 
research on higher cognition and fits very well with the idea that the construction of relational 
knowledge relies on working memory (Halford et al., 2010). It is, of course, difficult to 
exclude the possibility that some instances of Pavlovian conditioning in humans can occur in 
the absence of contingency awareness and working memory resources. However, after many 
years of research on this topic, I believe that it is safe to conclude that, if those instances exist 
in humans, they occur only when very strict boundary conditions are met (e.g., Greenwald & 
De Houwer, 2017). 1 While it definitely remains worthwhile to look for and document the 
boundary conditions of those instances of non-relational Pavlovian conditioning (see 
                                                 
1 Propositional theories cannot be dismissed simply on the basis of the fact that also nonhuman animals show 
Pavlovian conditioning (see De Houwer, Hughes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2016, for a discussion). First, it is possible 
that similar effects are produced by different mechanisms in different species. Second, it is possible that 
propositions (and thus relational knowledge) underlies conditioning also in (some) nonhuman animals. For more 
information on this and other possible objections to propositional models of conditioning, see Mitchell et al. 
(2009) and De Houwer (2018b). 
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McLaren et al., 2014, for a discussion of possible candidates), it can no longer be assumed by 
default that conditioning effects are non-relational in nature. On the contrary, I would argue 
that the burden of proof is now on those who wish to claim that specific instances of 
conditioning effects in humans are non-relational.  
Implicit Evaluation 
 Implicit evaluation can be defined as the automatic effect of stimuli on evaluative 
responses (De Houwer, Gawronski, & Barnes-Holmes, 2013). In less technical terms, it refers 
to the spontaneous “gut” feelings that people regularly experience. Most often, implicit 
evaluations are captured using indirect measures such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT; 
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). As is the case with Pavlovian conditioning, the 
most popular account of implicit evaluation relies on the notion of simple associations in 
memory (e.g., Fazio, 2007). More specifically, it is assumed that the representations of 
valenced stimuli in memory are associated with the representations of the concepts “good” or 
“bad”. Upon presentation of a valenced stimulus, activation of the stimulus representation 
will spread automatically to those evaluative representations and thus result in an automatic 
evaluative response.  
 Although the idea of automatic spreading of activation via associations provides a 
simple account of the automatic nature of implicit evaluation, it is not the only possible 
account. Recently, I put forward the idea that implicit evaluation is mediated by propositions 
(and thus relational knowledge; De Houwer, 2014; see also Mandelbaum, 2016). Whereas the 
formation of propositions might rely on working memory (and thus instructions, awareness, 
and resources), the retrieval of propositions could well be similarity-based and largely 
independent of working memory as is, for instance, postulated by episodic memory models 
(e.g., Hintzman, 1986; Logan, 1988; Schmidt, De Houwer, & Rothermund, 2016).  
 Several interesting predictions have been derived from a propositional account of 
                                          Relational Cognition 10 
implicit evaluation. A first line of research was based on the idea that propositions can result 
from instructions. Hence, if implicit evaluation reflects propositions, it should be sensitive to 
instructions. In line with this prediction, simply providing instructions about the evaluative 
properties of novel stimuli (e.g., Bob helps old ladies cross the street) is enough to produce 
changes in the implicit evaluation of those stimuli (e.g., automatic positive reactions to Bob; 
e.g., De Houwer, 2006; Cone, Mann, & Ferguson, 2017; Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006). One 
might object that these effects (a) arise only for process-impure measures that capture not 
only implicit but also explicit (i.e., non-automatic) evaluations, (b) are mediated by changes 
in explicit evaluations that produce changes in associations, or (c) are limited to novel 
stimuli. Recent evidence, however, argues against these possible objections. First, it has been 
shown that instruction-based implicit evaluations can be found on a wide variety of indirect 
measures (e.g., Van Dessel, Ye, & De Houwer, 2019), as well as on parameters in 
multinomial processing tree models designed to capture automatic processes (e.g., Smith, 
Calanchini, Hughes, Van Dessel, & De Houwer, in press). Second, research revealed that 
instructions can influence implicit evaluations even in the absence of changes in explicit 
evaluations (Van Dessel, De Houwer, Gast, Smith, & De Schryver, 2016). Third, to the 
extent that instructions provide diagnostic and credible information, they can alter even long-
standing, deeply rooted implicit evaluations. For instance, Van Dessel, Ye, et al. (2019) 
informed participants about an actual event in the life of Mahatma Gandhi during which he 
forbade doctors from giving a medicine to his wife, resulting in her death, but later took the 
medicine himself when he contracted the disease, resulting in his recovery. Simply providing 
this single piece of verbal information drastically reduced implicit liking of Gandhi on a 
variety of measures. 
 A second line of studies examined the impact of relational information on implicit 
evaluations. For instance, in a study by Peters and Gawronski (2011), participants saw on 
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each trial the name of a previously unknown person together with a positive or negative trait. 
Some persons were paired most often with a negative trait whereas other persons were paired 
most often with a positive trait. Importantly, in certain cases, participants were informed that 
a person had the traits opposite to the ones shown on the screen. This relational information 
had a significant impact on implicit evaluations but did not reverse them completely (also see 
Moran & Ban-Anan, 2013; Moran, Bar-Anan, & Nosek, 2016; Zanon, De Houwer, Gast, & 
Smith, 2014). This pattern of results could reflect the joint impact of propositions and 
associations on implicit evaluations but it could also reflect the joint impact of multiple 
propositions on implicit evaluations, some based on pairings (e.g., “this person co-occurred 
with positive traits”) and some based on relational information (e.g., “this person is good 
because he was paired with negative traits”; De Houwer, 2018b; Moran et al., 2016). 
Regardless of whether there is a significant contribution of associative (non-relational) 
processes, it is now widely accepted that propositions (and thus relational knowledge) have a 
profound impact on implicit evaluations. Hence, it is time to discard the assumption that 
implicit evaluation is by default non-relational in nature.  
Habitual Responding 
 Habit research is another stronghold of non-relational, associative theories. In fact, 
often habitual responding is even defined in terms of a non-relational mechanism, more 
specifically, the activation of responses via S-R associations. On the basis of this definition, 
habitual behavior is typically contrasted with goal-directed behavior, that is, behavior that is a 
function of its consequences (see Wood & Rünger, 2016, for a review). Whereas goal-
directed behavior can be based on relational knowledge (i.e., on how a response is related to 
realizing a goal), habitual responding in this technical sense is banned from the realm of 
relational cognition on an a priori basis.  
 Recently, however, serious questions have been raised about the quality of the evidence 
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for habitual responding in humans. In addition to genuine failures to find evidence for 
habitual responding (de Wit et al., 2018), alleged demonstrations of habitual behavior were 
criticized on the basis of inadequate controls for goal-directed processes. As my colleagues 
and I pointed out in a recent paper (De Houwer, Tanaka, Moors, & Tibboel, 2018), tests for 
goal-directed processes need to be both sensitive enough (sensitivity criterion) and look for 
all the goals at which the behavior could be directed (information criterion). Several studies 
that claimed to have found evidence for habitual responding in humans did not meet these 
criteria. Consider the well-known study of Neal, Wood, Wu, and Kurlander (2011) showing 
that people who often eat popcorn in movie theaters continue to eat popcorn in movie theaters 
when it is stale whereas control participants do not eat the stale popcorn. The behavior of the 
first group was considered to be habitual because a devaluation of the tastiness of the popcorn 
did not lead to a reduction of  popcorn consumption, suggesting that eating popcorn was not 
directed at the goal of eating tasty food. It is possible, however, that people who often eat 
popcorn when watching movies consume popcorn for other reasons than taste, for instance, to 
have a fuller cinematic experience. Eating stale popcorn might also serve this goal. Hence, 
the behavior of eating (stale) popcorn could well be goal-directed, be it directed at a goal 
different than the one that Neal et al. controlled for. Although we do not exclude the 
possibility that humans sometimes behave in purely stimulus-driven (i.e., habitual) ways, the 
picture that is emerging now is that goal-directed behavior is the default mode of behaving 
(Moors, Boddez, & De Houwer, 2017). 
 When considering this conclusion, it is important to realize that it only concerns 
habitual responding in the technical sense (i.e., behavior that is a function of the evoking 
stimulus but not of its current consequences). The term “habit” is often also used in a 
different sense, namely as behavior that is emitted frequently and/or automatically. There can 
be no doubt that humans often repeat the same behavior in similar situations and that 
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behavior can have features of automaticity (i.e., occur in the absence of conscious intentions, 
fast, or without awareness of the controlling variables; Moors & De Houwer, 2006b). These 
types of “habitual” behaviors, however, could well be goal-directed (see Aarts & 
Dijksterhuis, 2000; Bargh, 1990). In fact, more and more researchers are considering the 
possibility that impulsive behavior is strategic in nature (i.e., directed at goals; e.g., Kopetz, 
Woerner, & Briskin, 2018), including seemingly irrational behavior as seen in addiction 
(Baumeister, 2017; Hogarth, 2018). 
 Within the context of the present paper, it is important to note that associative (i.e., non-
relational) models dominate also research on automatic goal-directed behavior (e.g., Bargh, 
1990; Moskowitz, 2012). However, it is also possible that automatic goal-directed behavior 
depends on relational knowledge. In fact, one could argue that goal-representations are 
inherently relational in that they need to specify how someone relates to an end-state (i.e., the 
fact I desire the end-state) as well as the role that elements have in that relation (e.g., the fact 
that it is me who desires). Also goal-pursuit seems to necessitate the involvement of relational 
knowledge, more specifically, knowledge about whether and how an action promotes or 
hinders the realization of the desired end-state. Hence, it would be worthwhile to start 
exploring the role of relational knowledge in automatic goal-directed behavior.  
 To recapitulate: Whereas research in humans provided little evidence for habitual 
responding in a technical sense, human behavior is often habitual in a broad sense. In contrast 
to what is often argued, however, the latter behaviors might well depend on relational 
knowledge.  
Converging Arguments from Behavioral Research 
 Unbeknownst to many cognitive psychologists, a large number of psychological 
scientists still operate within the behavioral research traditions that originated from the work 
of behaviorists such as Skinner (1953). In this section, I draw attention to the fact that recent 
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developments in behavioral research are compatible with the idea that Pavlovian 
conditioning, implicit evaluation, and seemingly habitual behavior are grounded in relational 
knowledge.  
 To fully appreciate the merits of this argument, I first need to point out that behavioral 
and cognitive approaches in psychology have different goals and are therefore not 
competitors (De Houwer, 2011; Hughes, De Houwer, & Perugini, 2016). Behavioral 
researchers operate at the functional level of explanation that aims to explain behavior in 
terms of elements in the environment. Cognitive researchers, on the other hand, operate at the 
mental level of explanation that documents the mental mechanisms via which elements in the 
environment influence behavior (Bechtel, 2005; De Houwer, 2011). For instance, whereas 
behavioral researchers would explain increases in fear of a light in terms of parings of 
conditioned and unconditioned stimuli (i.e., Pavlovian conditioning as an abstract 
explanatory behavioral principle), cognitive researchers explain the impact of light-shock 
pairings on fear for the light in terms of the formation of associations or propositions (i.e., 
Pavlovian conditioning as a to-be-explained phenomenon). Rather than competitors, both 
approaches are mutually reinforcing in that knowing more about (the moderators of) 
environment-behavior relations constrains theories at the mental level whereas theories at the 
mental level can facilitate the discovery of (moderators of) environment-behavior relations 
(see Hughes et al., 2016, for a more detailed treatment of these ideas). 
 Within behavioral psychology, it has been proposed that much of human behavior is 
relational in nature (e.g., Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001). Behavioral researchers 
consider responding to be relational when it is a function not of a single event (e.g., the 
presence of a single light) but of the relation between events. For instance, people can learn to 
press a left key whenever two identical stimuli are presented on the screen and to press a right 
key whenever two non-identical stimuli are presented, regardless of what those stimuli are. 
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Importantly, behavioral researchers have recognized that humans can also respond 
relationally in arbitrary ways, a phenomenon they refer to as arbitrarily applicable relational 
responding (Hayes et al., 2001). For instance, the fact that people can respond as if the word 
“glass” has some functions in common with the object “glass” is considered to be an instance 
of relational responding that occurs even though the relation between the word and the object 
is arbitrary (as indicated by the fact that the same object is referred to in French as “verre”). 
Behavioral researchers have developed functional concepts to describe and analyze this type 
of relational behavior, paradigms to examine it, and coherent ideas about the learning history 
that is necessary to establish it (Hayes et al., 2001). Interestingly, despite extensive efforts, 
until now evidence for (flexible) arbitrarily applicable relational responding has not been 
found in non-human animals (e.g., Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2014; Lionello-DeNolf, 2009). 
This striking difference between species is consistent with the idea that arbitrarily applicable 
relational responding (present only in humans) lies as the heart of language (also present only 
in humans). 
 In line with the ideas put forward in this paper, it has been argued that also phenomena 
such as Pavlovian conditioning and implicit evaluation are instances of arbitrarily applicable 
relational responding. From this perspective, Pavlovian conditioning has much in common 
with symbolic phenomena like language. More specifically, the pairing of two stimuli is 
assumed to function as a symbolic cue that signals that the paired stimuli are equivalent in 
some ways, much like the word “SAME” signals the equivalence of stimuli. For instance, 
pairing a neutral word with a positive word is assumed to cue people to respond as if the two 
are equivalent, which includes responding to the originally neutral word in positive ways (De 
Houwer & Hughes, 2016). Likewise, implicit evaluation has been conceived of as a brief and 
immediate relational response to stimuli (Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, & Vahey, 2012). 
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a detailed discussion of these ideas 
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and findings (see Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2016, Hughes, De Houwer, & Barnes-Holmes, 
2016, and Törneke, 2010, for accessible introductions), for the present purposes, it is 
important to note that these developments in behavioral research fit very well the idea that 
also Pavlovian conditioning and implicit evaluation are mediated by relational knowledge. 
Indeed, any mental mechanism that can produce relational behavior must somehow draw on 
knowledge about how events are related (see De Houwer et al., 2016, for a more detailed 
discussion).  
Broader Implications 
 Examining whether phenomena such as Pavlovian conditioning, implicit evaluation, 
and habitual responding are based on relational knowledge allows us to move beyond the 
dual-system models that been highly influential both within and outside of psychology. A 
huge merit of the dual-system perspective is that it draws attention to the fact that humans 
often think and behave in automatic or irrational ways. This insight is undoubtedly one of the 
main achievements of cognitive psychology. However, the fact that humans think and behave 
in automatic and irrational ways does not necessitate the existence of a separate, irrational 
cognitive system (e.g., System 1). There are indeed many ways in which relational 
knowledge could produce automatic and irrational thoughts and behavior. As I noted earlier 
on in this paper, relational information could be activated automatically from memory, as is 
indicated by research on implicit evaluation (De Houwer, 2014). Automatic and irrational 
behavior can also result from quick-and-dirty inferences that occur automatically but take 
into account less information than slow and more elaborate inferences (e.g., Van Dessel, 
Hughes, & De Houwer, in press). In fact, predictive coding accounts of human cognition 
(e.g., Friston, 2010) imply that automatic inferences provide the foundation of many if not all 
of our mental abilities. For these and other reasons, more and more psychologists are 
abandoning dual-system models (e.g., Keren & Schul, 2009; Kruglanski, 2013; Melnikoff & 
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Bargh, 2018; Moors & De Houwer, 2006a).  
 Nevertheless, because dual-system models are so intuitively appealing, they are still 
being used widely as a communicative tool to educate people about the fact that human 
behavior is often automatic and irrational (e.g., Pennycook et al., 2018). It is important to 
realize, however, that the simplifications of a dual-system model can blind researchers from 
the insights offered by the possibility that automatic and irrational behavior is driven by 
relational knowledge. For example, whereas dual-system views highlight extensive training 
as the preferred way of changing automatic behavior, a relational perspective implies that 
instructions and inferential reasoning can be important tools for behavior change, also at the 
automatic level. This new perspective calls for more research on how relational knowledge 
shapes automatic and irrational behavior. Whereas it is unrealistic to believe that people can 
simply be instructed to change their automatic and irrational behavior, a change in these type 
of behaviors could be accomplished by identifying and altering those pieces of relational 
knowledge and those quick-and-dirty inferences that are driving automatic and irrational 
behavior (see Hogarth, 2018, for a discussion of how this idea is taking shape in research on 
the etiology and treatment of addiction, and Van Dessel, Hughes, & De Houwer, 2018, for an 
example of how it fosters innovations in behavior modification).  
 In sum, extending the realm of relational knowledge to include seemingly non-
relational phenomena provides an alternative for dual-system models, which can have a 
profound impact on the application of psychological knowledge inside and outside of 
psychology. Although it will be difficult, if not impossible to demonstrate that all cognition is 
relational (see Box 1), merely reexamining the role of relational knowledge has merits 
because it reveals new avenues for research and application. I hope that the present paper 
encourages researchers to further exploit this potential. 
 




Box 1.  Questions for Future Research 
1.   Are there psychological phenomena that are not based on relational knowledge (e.g., 
perceptual and S-R binding, Perruchet effect)? If so, what knowledge are they based 
on and when does which type of knowledge matter? 
2.  Behavioral researchers have identified different types of relational behavior (i.e., non-
arbitrarily applicable relational responding vs. arbitrarily applicable relational 
responding; e.g., Hayes et al., 2001). Does this mean that there are different types of 
relational knowledge (De Houwer et al., 2016)? If so, what are the differences and 
when does which type of relational knowledge mediate behavior? 
3.  What are the learning experiences from which the ability to think and act relationally 
emerge (see Hayes et al., 2001, for suggestions)?  
4.  How can deficits in relational cognition (and thus relational behavior) be remedied (see 
Hayes et al., 2001, and Gentner, 2016, for suggestions)? 
5.  How can relational knowledge be represented (e.g., in associative networks; see 
Hummel, 2010, for a discussion)? 
6.  In what ways can nonhuman animals think and act relationally (see Hughes & Barnes-
Holmes, 2014, Lionello-DeNolf, 2009, Penn, Holyoak, & Povinelli, 2008, for a 
discussion)? 
7.  What is the role of relational knowledge in automatic goal-directed behavior?  
8.  What are the mental processes via which relational knowledge influences more 
automatic instances of behavior? If relational knowledge can be operated upon by 
both similarity-based retrieval processes and automatic inferences, when does which 
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type of process operate? 
9.  What is the nature of automatic (i.e., quick-and-dirty) inferences and how can they be 
influenced?  
10.   Can irrational and impulsive behaviors be changed by changing (the processes 
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